The hearing will be called to order.

Thank you all for joining us today. Ambassador Walker, in particular,

I want to thank you for being here. This will be your first

appearance in front of the committee since your confirmation hearing.

So, I am delighted to have you here.

Senator Wellstone will be joining us. He has another meeting but

will be joining us in the hearing. I hope some other members will

as well.

Before we get started, I hope, Ambassador Walker, that you have

a chance and will take the opportunity to address a broad range

of issues, although the hearing today is about Iraq. If I had my

druthers, we would be discussing a wide range of issues here today

and not just the question of Iraq, particularly issues like what is

taking place in the peace process, specifically the discussions regarding

the Syrian track.

Congress, I would note to you, clearly wants to be consulted before

any agreement is reached that will involve significant U.S. dollars

and/or the use of U.S. troops or observers in any sort of peace

agreement. This is something that the Congress wants to know

about before any fait accompli occurs.

Also, I hope you feel free to take the opportunity to discuss sanctions

concessions on Iran, potentially on Libya. But today’s hearing

is about Iraq, and we will stay to that topic, but feel free to comment

on these others because they are very pressing issues of interest

and concern.

It has long been my belief that policy toward Iraq should be really

a rather simple matter. One, Iraq must be disarmed completely.

Two, failing total disarmament, Saddam Hussein should be removed

from power. This administration has embraced to, a greater

or lesser degree, both of these goals, and in both cases, I wonder

really if the administration has lost sight of its objectives.

On the question of disarmament, there have been no weapons inspectors

in Iraq for well over a year. We have no idea what Saddam is up to. We can be pretty sure it is not good for us. In order

to get inspectors back in, the United States has agreed to water

down the inspection regime and weaken the sanctions regime. And

even those concessions have not bought compliance from Saddam.

Now, to an observer, the situation is not too complicated. At the

end of 1998, the United States launched a military operation

against Iraq because Saddam was not cooperating with UNSCOM.

A year later UNSCOM was disbanded by the Security Council with

the help of the United States, and a kinder, gentler commission

was created. Now, what changed? Not Saddam, that is for sure.

What changed was the U.S.’s position and resolve.

The administration seems to be listening to those who blame

sanctions for the suffering of the Iraqi people. We signed on to the

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 which lifted any ceiling on

Iraqi oil exports. Saddam now has more oil flowing than he did before

the Gulf war and at a much better price I might add. In spite

of that, we have agreed to soften the inspections regime and the

sanctions regime, which to my mind will help neither the people of

Iraq nor U.S. interests.

Now, I hope it is abundantly clear at this point in time that Saddam

Hussein is the enemy of the Iraqi people. As well, he is an

adversary of ours and of the United Nations. Let us face up to that

fact once and for all. For the sake of the Iraqi people and for the

interests of the American people and our allies, Saddam should be

removed. It really is as simple as that.

I look forward to your statement. Ambassador Walker, I appreciate

your expertise. I have appreciated the friendship and being

able to work with you. I have to say, though, in my observation of

what we are doing toward Iraq right now, it reminds me of the

NCAA tournament and somebody ahead in the game, or even behind

in the game, and sitting on the ball. We just are not pressing

the issue forward at all. At all. I see nothing observable that we

want to change regimes in Iraq anytime during the Clinton administration,

that we are going to press for a different disarmament regime

in Iraq anytime during the Clinton administration. It is as if

we are just kind of running out the clock and we are behind in the

game, which does not make much sense to do.

So, I hope you can persuade me differently, but my observation

of this is not very hopeful. And I have not seen the implementation

of the Iraq Liberation Act to any degree of which the Congress intended

for that act to be implemented and pressed forward. This

is a broad-based concern in the Congress, particularly in the Senate.

It is a bipartisan concern. Senator Kerrey from Nebraska and

I talk often about this issue of concern about what is taking place

in Iraq and the signal that we have sent to our allies who are

neighbors with Iraq in the region that, look, Saddam is just going

to be there. Deal with it. I do not think that is the right signal for

us to be sending to them, nor one that we should be sitting on our

hands letting the clock run out on this administration in our policy

of dealing toward Iraq.

So, hopefully you can tell me that there are more and better

things that are on the horizon that are going to be happening dealing

with Iraq and some of these other issues that we discussed at

the outset. I look forward to your testimony.

But we have been joined by the ranking member of the committee.

I am delighted to have him here and present. Senator

Biden, the floor is yours.

And I am willing to work on that. I do note

in that meeting, the Iraq opposition was not asking for U.S. troops.

They were asking for us to implement that act——

And press forward with its implementation

which, it strikes me, has been very slow to come.

Now, maybe you have a different report for us today, Ambassador

Walker, and I hope that is the case.

The floor is yours.

I would be happy to provide that at a time

when you can come back. I would enjoy and would appreciate your

presentation of it today, but we will get a time where you are available

and we will discuss it thoroughly.

Do you expect Saddam Hussein to be in

power at the end of the Clinton administration?

You stated this week you signed a contract

with the INC for a quarter million dollars. Your total authorization

in that program I believe is around $97 million.

How much money has the Clinton administration

used this fiscal year to support the INC?

Is that the primary expense that you have

had is the support of the meeting in New York?

Has any money been authorized to be used

by the INC within Iraq?

And you do not mention lethal assistance

to the INC in that listing. Is that correct?

Any notions of how much time it will take

to build that solid foundation? You have had the authorization and

the approval from Congress for—what—a year and a half, 2 years

now with the INC?

It looks like you have not even got the footings.

Mr. Ambassador, it strikes me that what is

taking place is the thing that a number of us feared and that is

that Saddam—and the administration is in complicity with this—

is just waiting you out, that there is not a serious effort on the part

of the administration to remove Saddam from power, that we have

lost our inspection regime within Iraq. There has not been a serious

inspection regime in place for a year within Iraq. And everybody

is virtually satisfied with that situation presently and that

there is no serious effort within the administration to do anything

differently, to find a different group than the INC if you do not

think that they can do that, to find a different means to really get

at Saddam, to find a different sort of inspection regime. And all

along, the clock is ticking and the rest of the world and others are

starting to reengage Saddam.

So, at the end of the day, we are left with

him still in power, still in Baghdad, more oil revenues flowing than

he had even prior to the war, and our neighbors and our allies in

the region saying, well, we did not think you were going to get rid

of him, and I guess we will just have to deal with him. I do not

know how one comes to a different conclusion than that, given

what is in play today.

I know they are serious people. I have met

with them as well. But it seems as if what you are presenting is

that we are going to keep Saddam under house arrest and then he

continues to buildup stronger, and we are really not building his

opposition up.

I want to visit some other questions, but we will go ahead.

Well, let me ask some questions along this

line because I am very troubled about where we are with this. One

of the main reasons UNSCOM had any successes at all, it seems

to me, was its willingness to go to the mat, to be very

confrontational and very direct and go where Saddam did not want

them to go. Now we have got Mr. Blix, the new head of UNMOVIC,

who has said he would like to work more cooperatively with Iraq.

Now, really, is it the administration’s view that UNMOVIC can

conduct effective inspections if cooperation with Saddam is a primary

goal of inspections?

Well, Saddam Hussein has shown time and

time again that he is going to confront and he is going to try to

confuse and misdirect and not comply. Period.

Let us say that we do and we confront. And

one of the reasons we justified Operation Desert Fox was by saying

that Iraq was not complying with U.N. weapons inspections. Are

we going to be willing to use military action to force Iraq to allow

inspectors to return?

Is it not even a probability, I mean, in the

70 to 80 percent range, that if we go to another inspections regime

and we have any confrontational nature of it at all, we are going

to be placed in the situation of having to determine to use military

force to force Saddam to comply because of his past actions? We

know that this is what he is going to do. You know, in all probability,

you are going to face that the decision that you have to

make that recommendation within the administration. Is that not

part of the premise of what you are going into this with?

What if he does not comply with inspections?

We have established the other red lines: attacking

the Kurds, U.S. forces. We can establish the red line of not

complying with inspections.

Well, I would hope we would establish it as

a red line.

Now, how long are we giving Saddam to accept this UNMOVIC

inspection regime?

Will we at least establish a time line that

it be during this administration?

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for coming. I

do want to emphasize that we have a number of topics that I would

like to discuss at a future hearing with you, with the administration’s

lifting of a series of sanctions on Iran to its perspective on

Libya. I have to tell you I read about those, and it looks like we

have got a quid but no quo policy just of lifting these for hope of

things to come, but nothing there of concrete. I hope we can have

a thorough discussion of those.

I want to, once again, say to the administration, do not bring to

us an Israel/Syria track discussion conclusion without pre-discussion

of this with the Congress. If it is going to involve substantial

sums of money from this country, use of our personnel or troops,

weapons systems, observation systems, we need to know and we

need to be talking about this thoroughly before any sort of agreement

fait accompli is presented. We all want peace, but if you are

asking us or just presenting us a final agreement, particularly

some of the discussion of expense that I have heard, some of the

discussion of personnel, we want to know about this much further

in advance before some agreement is struck. I hope at some time

we can have you up to talk about that as well. But we will certainly

get you here on Iran and on Libya in the near future.

Thank you, if I could say too, for patience in our questioning. A

number of us have sharp thoughts and a great deal of frustration

on dealing with Iraq, and I appreciate the manner in which you

handled the questions that we put in front of you.

Well, and I appreciate that. I have not received

any of the consultations as to what the outline is to be.

What I have been reading in the press, my source of information

on this, talks about some very large, substantial sums of money

that would be within the power of the purse of this body that I

think we need to be having a lot of discussion about.

Again, thank you for your manner and

thank you for your dedication. You have done a wonderful job as

a public servant. We may not agree on some topics as they come

up, but I certainly do not doubt your heart nor your ability as I

have seen it as an ambassador and as I see it now. We will continue

the vigorous discussion. Thank you very much.

The second panel is Mr. Gary Milhollin. He

is the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Mr. Paul Leventhal, president, Nuclear Control Institute in Washington,

DC, and the final panel member, Mr. Charles Duelfer,

former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM out of New York.

We will have the panelists seated and we will ask you to make

your presentations in the order that we announced.

Gentlemen, we can accept your full transcript into the record. If

you can make your presentations within a 5 minute or so area so

that we could have plenty of time, ample time for questions, I think

that would be the best to go by. So, we will run a 5-minute clock

here to give you some idea. We will take ahead of time all of your

full statements in the record, so we will have those as well.

Mr. Milhollin.

Thank you and thank you for the specific

recommendations. I do think it is a good point about the recommendation

to Dr. Blix now to—we are watching and we need to

have a robust, aggressive inspection regime system in place.

Mr. Charles Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of

UNSCOM, we are very pleased to be able to have you here in the

committee.

Thank you. I think that is a very good

thought, that the Security Council is going to determine a lot of

what takes place.

Do we know from the internal discussions

in the Security Council that there is this sort of advice to Dr. Blix

going on right now about do not be too confrontational or do be

confrontational? Do we know what sort of discussions are taking

place?

Mr. Leventhal—or Mr. Milhollin, if you

care to comment—if the United States is not strongly committed to

a clear, aggressive, robust inspection regime, is it likely that one

will occur?

Are any signals being sent out from anybody

on the Security Council in the discussions?

I am hearing something different from

them than you are then, Senator Biden. I think there is a lot of

agreement that is here, but what I hear them saying is that if the

United States does not show resolve and clear resolve and intensity

on this—and perhaps maybe the most troubling thing that has

come out today is Ambassador Walker’s statement that there is not

a bright line on the weapons inspection issue because the United

States is going to have to show that sort of intensity if we are going

to have a weapons inspection system because otherwise it really

will be a pretend type of system. It is incumbent upon us, I think,

in the Congress to say we do want something that is clear that we

will do and let us establish that line if we are going to have a

weapons inspection system.

And then Blix is it, whether we want him or not. He is it. Now

let us say that the United States will back it up and let us buck

him up.

That is a good part of, I think, the solution.

I think that is a good notion.

Mr. Duelfer, what do you think of that, of

the U.S. Congress speaking that way?

I agree. It is forced disarmament is what

we have been after all along.

My concern is I am not sure where we are

either on it. Perhaps that is where something of a statement

through Congress and to the President might help at least clarify

that point over which we have some control and is a better stadium

to play in.

Gentlemen, thank you all for joining us today.